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The Deductibility of Antitrust
Treble Damage Payments
Stephen B. Scallen*
I. INTRODUCTION
Any person injured by a violation of the antitrust laws may
bring a suit for treble damages under section 4 of the Clayton
Act.' The United States may bring damage claims for similar
violations under section 4A of the Clayton Act 2 or under the
Federal False Claims Act.3 There is some doubt, however, as to
whether damages paid as the result of such suits should be
deductible as a business expense for federal income tax purposes.
The Internal Revenue Code provides: "There shall be al-
lowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses
paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any
trade or business . . ."4 The code itself sets out only two
policy exceptions to the availability of this business deduc-
tion: bribes to foreign officials under section 162 (c) and cer-
tain lobbying expenses under section 162(e). However, a
judicial "public policy exception," denying the deduction for
fines and penalties, has long been applied. 5 Thus, it may be
argued that a deduction for the payment of damages arising
out of violations of the antitrust laws should be disallowed,
since such damages are arguably fines or penalties. In Reve-
nue Ruling 64-224,o however, the Internal Revenue Service
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. This study was as-
sisted by a grant from the University of Minnesota Graduate School.
1. Any person who shall be injured in his business or prop-
erty by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may
sue therefor . . .and shall recover threefold the damages by
him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable at-
torney's fee.
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1964).
3. 31 U.S.C. § 231 (1964).
4. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 162 (a).
5. Commissioner v. Longhorn Portland Cement Co., 148 F.2d 276
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 728 (1945); Burroughs Material Co. v.
Commissioner, 147 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1943); Helvering v. Superior Wines
& Liquors, Inc., 134 F.2d 373 (8th Cir. 1943); Tunnel Ry. v. Commissioner,
61 F.2d 166 (8th Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 228 U.S. 604 (1933); Chicago, R.I.
& P. Ry. v. Commissioner, 47 F.2d 990 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S.
618 (1931); Great N. Ry. v. Commissioner, 40 F.2d 372 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 282 U.S. 855 (1930).
6. 1964-2 Cum. Bumt. 52. A partial bibliography of materials
on the general subject includes: Arent, Inequities in Non-Deductibility
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ruled that treble damages paid under section 4 of the Clayton
Act are deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses,
but that damages paid to the United States under section 4A
of the Clayton Act or under the Federal False Claims Act are
not deductible.7
The purpose of this Article is to demonstrate that Revenue
Ruling 64-224 is not supported by the relevant case authority,
that it is not supported by the relevant policy considerations, and
that its issuance was not an appropriate use of the ruling power.
II. THE AUTHORITIES
A. THE STATUTES AND LEGISLATIVE [STORY
Neither the Internal Revenue Code nor the antitrust laws
gives any guidance on the issue of the deductibility of antitrust
treble damage payments.
1. The Tax Law
Congress has specifically provided for the denial of a deduc-
tion for certain illegal payments, such as payments made in vio-
lation of price regulations8 and the payment of wages above
specified ceilings,9 but no such limitation has been included in
the business expense deduction provision.
of Fines, Penalties, Defense Expenses, 87 J. ACCOUNTING 482 (1949);
Boland, Income Tax Treatment of Antitrust Damages, 22 TAx L. REv. 47
(1966); Diamond, The Relevance of Public Policy in Disallowance of
Income Tax Deductions, 44 TAXES 803 (.966); Hart, A Tax Formula To
Restore the Historical Effects of the Antitrust Treble Damage Provisions,
65 Mic. L. REv. 245 (1966); Noall & Traxell, Tax Aspects of Antitrust
Proceedings, 18 TAx L. REv. 213 (1963); Paul, The Use of Public Policy
by the Commissioner in Disallowing Deductions, U. So. CAL. 1954 TAx.
INsT. 715; Comment, Treble Damages--Tax Treatment and Antitrust
Policy, 27 CATE. U.L. Rsv. 102 (1967); Note, Deduction of Business Ex-
penses: Illegality and Public Policy, 54 :'EARv. L. REv. 852 (1941); Note,
Present and Proposed Tax Treatment of Antitrust Treble Damage Pay-
ments, 52 IowA L. REv. 974 (1967); Note, Taxation-Business Expenses
Deduction of Clayton Act Treble Damages, 45 N.C.L. REV. 1108 (1967);
Comment, Federal Taxation-Ordinary and Necessary Business Expenses
and the Antitrust Laws, 9 ST. Louis U.L.J. 417 (1963); Note, Business
Expenses, Disallowance and Public Policy: Some Problems of Sanction-
ing with the Internal Revenue Code, 72 YALE L.J. 108 (1962); Comment,
35 FoRDAEin L. REV. 677 (1967).
7. The Service also held that the expenses of defending the latter
class of suits, including attorney fees, could not be deducted. That part
of the ruling has been withdrawn and reversed by Rev. Rul. 330, 1966-2
Cum. BuLL. 44, in the wake of Commisioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687
(1966).
8. Revenue Production Act of 1950, § 405(a), as amended, 50
U.S.C. § 965(a) (1964).
9. Stabilization Act of 1942, § 5(a), 56 Stat. 767.
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Prior to the passage of the Revenue Act of 1913,10 however,
a proposal to limit the deduction of illegal losses, particularly
those resulting from gambling, was considered. Senator Sterling
of South Dakota thought that the deduction for losses should be
restricted solely to those "losses incurred in legitimate and ordi-
nary trade pursued by the party."" However, Senator Ster-
ling's proposal was defeated,'1 2 Senator Williams, the floor mana-
ger of the bill, clearly stating that the object of the legislation
was "not to reform men's morals."' 3
In 1951, a similar proposal to deny the deductibility of "any
expense paid or incurred in or as a result of illegal wagering"' 4
was defeated. 6 While debate on this proposal, as on the previous
one, was limited to the context of gambling expenses, Congress'
failure to adopt the limitation does indicate that it had no
intention of denying the deduction to all the general expenses
of an illegal business. 6 Congress has not considered any further
proposals to limit the business expense deduction on public pol-
icy grounds, although it has on rare occasions reacted to judicial
decisions denying the deduction on such grounds.'7
2. The Antitrust Laws
There is no indication in the antitrust laws themselves or in
their legislative history that Congress considered the tax conse-
quences of the payment of treble damages. The judicial deci-
sions denying the deduction for fines and penalties do, however,
provide a basis for the argument that the deductibility of anti-
trust treble damages should depend upon whether the payments
are penal or remedial in nature. The claim that the treble dam-
ages payments are penal and, therefore, nondeductible, finds
support in the legislative history of the Sherman Act.
In successfully urging rejection of an amendment to the
Act which would have given state courts concurrent jurisdiction
over the federal cause of action for treble damages, Senator Hoar,
described as "in large measure the author of the [bill] in its
10. Revenue Act of 1913, §§ II(a) & G(b), 38 Stat. 166.
11. 50 CONG. REC. 3849 (1913).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 3850.
14. 97 CONG. REc. 12,230-31 (1951).
15. Id. at 12,244.
16. Id.
17. E.g., INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 162 (e), added in reaction to Cam-
marano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959), discussed at text accom-
panying note 35 infra.
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final form,""' characterized the treble damage provision as penal:
This section . . . is a section establishing a penalty, threefold
damages .... [N]o court enforces penalties except those cre-
ated by the authority which creates the court, and no statute of
any foreign or other authority but that can clothe the court
with that power....
We might perhaps say that a person who owed to another
a sum of money under an obligation solely the creature of a
statute of the United States might recover in any State court;
and if the obligation were created he could recover it equally,
whether we said so or not; but we can not say that a State
court shall be clothed with jurisdiction to enforce a claim for
threefold the damages suffered, which is purely penal and puni-
tive.19
The author of the concurrent jurisdiction amendment, Senator
Reagan, replied:
This measure is giving a civil remedy. It is not in the nature
of prosecution for crime. It is a civi remedy for damage done.
It is true that it fixes a part of the measure of the damages in
a civil suit providing that the defendamt may be required to pay
triple damages and costs, and attorney's fees; but that is part of
the measure of damages in a civil suit and is not in the nature
of a prosecution for a crime.20
The debate centered on the characterization of treble damages
as a penalty for the purpose of determining jurisdiction, not
for the purpose of determining the tax consequences of their
payment. Moreover, while Senator Reagan stressed the civil
nature of treble damages in this and another context,21 he did
not deny that they would have a punitive effect on the guilty
party. The thrust of Senator Reagan's argument was that treble
damages were generally a civil remedy for the benefit of the in-
jured party and that a state court could entertain a suit under
that provision of the Act if Congress did not make the federal
court jurisdiction exclusive.
It is clear, however, that these labels were applied for non-
tax purposes and, therefore, should not mechanically control the
tax consequences of the payment of -treble damages. The treble
damage provision is not exclusively either a punitive or a civil
remedy; rather, it is at once a remedy for the injured party, an
incentive for the injured party to enforce the antitrust laws,
and a penalty against the violator. There is nothing inconsis-
tent in this characterization, since, as pointed out by Justice
18. Haskell v. Perkins, 28 F.2d 222, 223 (D.N.J. 1928), rev'd on
other grounds, 31 F.2d 53 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 872 (1929).
19. 21 CoNe. REC. 3146-47 (1890).
20. Id. at 3147.
21. Id. at 2563.
1152 [Vol. 52:1149
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Cardozo, "the same provision may be penal as to the offender
and remedial to the sufferer.... The nature of the problem
will determine whether we are to take one viewpoint or the
other."2
2
B. THE SuPR=WE COURT NoNTAx CASES
In Revenue Ruling 64-224, the Internal Revenue Service
stated:
Actions brought under Section 4 of the Clayton Act are
remedial in nature since the purpose behind this section of the
statute is to provide the victim with a means of recovering dam-
ages inflicted, and not to punish the wrongdoer, in the sense of a
punishment "imposed and enforced by the State, for a crime
or offense against its laws."123
In support of this statement, the Service cited four Supreme
Court cases. Upon close examination, however, none of these
cases provides support for the Service's position.
The language quoted in this passage is from Huntington v.
Attrill,24 which involved a New York judgment under a New
York statute making the officers of a corporation liable for the
corporate debts if they sign and record a false certificate of
the amount of its capital stock. The Maryland Court of Ap-
peals refused to give full faith and credit to this New York judg-
ment on the ground that it had been entered in an action for a
penalty. The Supreme Court, reversing the Maryland court, held
that the statute was not penal in the conflict of laws sense:
But as it gives a civil remedy, at the private suit of the
creditor only, and measured by the amount of his debt, it is as
to him clearly remedial. To maintain such a suit is not to
administer a punishment imposed upon an offender against the
State, but simply to enforce a private right secured under its
laws to an individual. We can see no just ground, on principle,
for holding such a statute to be a penal law, in the sense that
it cannot be enforced in a foreign state or country.25
Thus, the Court held that an action is penal in the conflict of
laws sense only if it is brought by the state to punish an offense
committed against the state. However, the Court recognized that
a statute may be penal for one purpose but not for another,
stating that the New York statute involved could "be consid-
ered penal, in the sense that it should be strictly construed.1
26
22. Cox v. Lyke Bros., 237 N.Y. 376, 380, 143 N.E. 226, 227-28
(1924).
23. Rev. Rul. 224, 1964-2 CuM. BuLL. 52, 54.
24. 146 U.S. 657, 667 (1892).
25. Id. at 676-77.
26. Id. at 676.
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In Huntington, the Court gave the penal concept a restrictive
meaning in the context of the full faith and credit clause, in
order to facilitate the enforcement of the judgments of one state
in the courts of another. Such a characterization for full
faith and credit purposes does not provide a standard for the
characterization of a statute in the tax context.
In the second case cited in the Revenue ruling, Chattanooga
Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta,27 the Court, citing Huntington,
held that a penal statute of limitations was not applicable to a
treble damage claim under the Sherman Act. The Court's hold-
ing was consistent with the Sherman Act policy of discouraging
anticompetitive business practices, but it does not provide much
help in characterizing treble damages for federal income tax
deduction purposes. It may suggest, however, that the anti-
trust laws should be given an interpretation for tax purposes
that reinforces federal antitrust policy.
The third case cited, Overnight Motor Transportation Com-
pany v. Missel,28 involved the question of whether the double
damages authorized by the Fair Labor Standards Act2 9 in the
event of nonpayment of wages were mandatory and, if so,
whether they were constitutional. Holding that they were both
mandatory and constitutional, the Court stated that
[t]he liquidated damages for failure to pay the minimum
wages . . . are compensation, not a -penalty or punishment by
the Government. Cf. Huntington v. Attrill .... Nor can it
be said that the exaction is violative of due process. It is not a
threat of criminal proceedings or prohibitive fines, such as have
been held beyond legislative power .... Even double damages
treated as penalties have been upheld as within constitu-
tional power.30
It is not clear why the Court stated that these payments were
not penal, since it suggested that the double recovery would be
constitutional even if characterized as a penalty. At any rate,
although the Court concluded that the double damages provision
was remedial in the context of the Fair Labor Standards Act,
that characterization should not be controlling for purposes
of the business expense deduction in the context of the antitrust
laws.
The fourth case, introduced in the ruling by a "see also"
signal, is United States v. Cooper Corporation,31 in which the
27. 203 U.S. 390 (1906).
28. 316 U.S. 572 (1942).
29. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1964).
30. 316 U.S. at 583-84.
31. 312 U.S. 600 (1941).
1154 [Vol. 52:1149
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Supreme Court described the treble damage provision as "giving a
civil action for an injury to property rights. '32 In Cooper, the
Court excluded the United States from the statutory phrase
"any person" entitled to recover treble damages under section 7,
relying not on any characterization of the section as remedial or
penal, but on fifty years of government practice, statutory con-
struction, and the legislative history of the Act. The case con-
tributes nothing to an analysis of the deduction issue, and the
reference to "civil action" has no obvious meaning that can be
transferred to the tax context.
The Service's use of language from nontax cases, which pro-
vides superficial support to a characterization of the treble
damage provision as remedial without examining the policies in-
volved in each case, is not the type of analysis modern legal
scholars can accept. The Cooper case does not bear on the prob-
lem in any meaningful way, and the other cases cited do not
support the conclusion that the provision should be character-
ized as remedial only. The only guideline which can be inferred
from the cases is that the Court is likely to adopt a characteriza-
tion which will implement the federal policy behind the anti-
trust laws.
C. THE SuP COURT TAx CASES
1. The Lobbying Expense Cases
In Textile Mills Security Corporation v. Commissioner,33 the
Supreme Court denied deductibility to a contingent fee lobbying
contract, basing its holding on public policy. In Cammarano v.
United States,34 the Supreme Court denied deductibility to ex-
penses incurred to influence legislation. 5 In both cases, the
Court relied heavily upon treasury regulations dating back to
1918 which prohibited deductions for such expenses. These cases,
therefore, do not contribute to an analysis of the scope of the
public policy exception as applied to potential deductions that
are not the subject of longstanding regulations.
2. The Illegal Expenses of an Illegal Business
In Commissioner v. Sullivan,36 the Supreme Court held
that both the legal and illegal expenses of an illegal bookmaking
32. Id. at 608.
33. 314 U.S. 326 (1941).
34. 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
35. See note 17 supra.
36. 356 U.S. 27 (1958).
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business are deductible. The payment of rent for premises
used for bookmaking was itself illegal under Illinois law, but
the Court, in a brief opinion, emphasized that the effect of
denying the deduction would be the .iposition of a gross income
tax on the business. The Court indicated that the decision to
tax an illegal business on the basis of gross income should be
made by the legislature, not the courts.3 7
The Sullivan holding is sound for several reasons. The
legislative history indicates that Congress has rejected proposals
to limit the business expense deduction to legitimate expenses. 38
Denial of the deduction would eliminate the concept of a net in-
come tax on an illegal business, and thus might involve a greater
use of the federal tax law as an instrument to enforce local
statutes than is desirable in a federal system. In addition,
such a denial might lead to complete nonreporting of income by
illegal businesses. Since the deterrent effect of denying the de-
duction is probably insignificant for an illegal business because
of the alternative of complete tax avoidance, and since any
danger of frustration of public policy which may result from
denying the deductibility of illegal business expenses is out-
weighed by these other factors, the deduction was properly
permitted.
3. Fines and Penalties
Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner3 9 is the most sig-
nificant authority relevant to the subject of this Article. In that
case, the Supreme Court held that fines paid for violations of a
Pennsylvania maximum truck weight law were not deductible as
ordinary and necessary business expenses, despite the fact that
economic necessity compelled the taxpayer to operate the trucks
fully loaded,40 and despite a finding that "[o]peration of par-
tially loaded trucks ... would have created safety hazards.
"41
37. Id. at 29.
38. See text accompanying notes 10-1.7 supra.
39. 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
40. It is uncontested that trucking o-perations were so hindered
by this situation that neither petitioner nor other bulk liquid
truckers could operate profitably and also observe the Penn-
sylvania law.... Operation of partially loaded trucks ...
would have been economically impossible for any carrier so long
as the rest of the industry continued capacity loading. And
the industry as a whole could not operate on a partial load
basis without driving shippers to competing forms of transpor-
tation.
Id. at 32-33.
41. Id. at 32.
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The Court also denied deductibility to fines imposed for inno-
cent violations of the weight limit statute, such as those caused
by temperature changes in transit.42 The taxpayer had relied
upon the holding of the Second Circuit in Jerry Rossman Cor-
poration v. Commissioner,43 allowing deductions for amounts in-
advertently collected as overcharges by the Office of Price Ad-
ministration, and then paid over to the Government. In Ross-
man, Judge Learned Hand first concluded that a simple repay-
ment of the overcharge without the additional double damages
provided by the Act was not a penalty.44 However, even if such
a repayment were to be characterized as a penalty, Hand pointed
out that "there are 'penalties' and 'penalties', and . . .some are
deductible and some are not."45 Judge Hand then concluded that
allowance of the deduction did not frustrate the public policy
underlying the Act, since the Administrator claimed discretion
not to sue for treble damages in cases of inadvertent violation.4 6
However, since the Pennsylvania statute involved in Tank Truck
Rentals did not differentiate between willful and innocent vio-
lators, the Court concluded that state policy would be equally
frustrated by allowing the deduction of the specified overweight
charges in either case.
The Supreme Court might have distinguished Rossman on
the ground that it did not involve a penalty, or at least that it
did not involve a criminal penalty. Instead, the Court seized
upon the frustration doctrine as formulated by Hand, con-
cluding that although a deduction is allowed for ordinary and
necessary business expenses, "[a] finding of 'necessity' cannot
be made ... if allowance of the deduction would frustrate
sharply defined national or state policies proscribing particular
types of conduct, evidenced by some governmental declaration
thereof."47
42. Id. at 36-37.
43. 175 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1949).
44. The Rossman holding that there was no penalty since no
damages were paid beyond the amount of the overcharge may give
some support to the denial of the deduction of antitrust treble damages
beyond the actual amount of injury, although the Service cited Ross-
man in support of its analysis in Revenue Ruling 64-224.
45. 175 F.2d at 713.
46. Id. at 714.
47. 356 U.S. at 33-34. In support of this statement, the Court cited
Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943), which held that the
legal expenses of defending a mail fraud case were deductible, and
Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90 (1952), which held that expenditures
by opticians as kickbacks to doctors were deductible. The Court then
said that the frustration doctrine
was foreshadowed in Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commis-
1968] 1157
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The Court examined the state policies behind the maximum
truck weight statute, the deterrence issue, and the possible frus-
tration of public policy if the deduction were allowed, and
concluded that the fines were penalties and not just a revenue
raising toll.48 The facts were rather weak in this respect, how-
ever, as the Court admitted:
It is true that the Pennsylvania statute provides for purchase
of a single-trip permit by an overweighted trucker; that its
provision for forcing removal of the excess weight at the dis-
cretion of the police authorities apparently was never en-
forced; and that the fines were devoted by statute to road re-
pair within the municipality or township where the trucker
was apprehended. 49
Although the state policy was clearly defined, the fines
were small and were assessed only in Pennsylvania and only
on the drivers. If the state had been seriously interested in
enforcing its public policy, it might have employed more serious
sanctions, such as unloading, increased fines for repeating of-
fenders, jail sentences, and license revocations. 0 Thus, the
Court's conclusion that the fines were not a revenue raising
toll was based solely on the fact that the fine was assessed and
paid only when a violation of the weight limit statute was de-
tected and the violator was apprehended by the police.51
Nevertheless, the Court's analysis of the deductibility prob-
lem is useful:
Petitioner's failure to comply with the state laws obviously was
based on a balancing of the cost of compliance against the
chance of detection. Such a course cannot be sanctioned, for
judicial deference to state action requires, whenever possible,
that a State not be thwarted in its policy. We will not pre-
sume that the Congress, in allowing deductions for income tax
purposes, intended to encourage a business enterprise to violate
the declared policy of a State. To allow the deductions sought
sioner, 314 U.S. 326 (1941), where the Court, finding no con-
gressional intent to the contrary, upheld the validity of an in-
come tax regulation reflecting an administrative distinction
"between legitimate expenses and those arising from that fam-
ily of contracts to which the law has given no sanction." 314
U.S., at 339. Significant reference was made in Heininger to
the very situation now before us; the Court stated, '"Where a
taxpayer has violated a federal or a state statute and in-
curred a fine or penalty he has not been permitted a tax deduc-
tion for its payment." 320 U.S., at 473.
356 U.S. at 34.
48. 356 U.S. at 34.
49. Id. at 36.
50. Indeed, the state subsequently enacted a statute requiring
unloading and progressive fines. At the same time, however, the weight
restriction was raised to 60,000 pounds, the same restriction adopted by
the adjoining states.
51. 356 U.S. at 34, 36.
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here would but encourage continued violations of state law by
increasing the odds in favor of noncompliance. This could
only tend to destroy the effectiveness of the State's maximum
weight laws. 52
The Court added that:
the test of nondeductibility always is the severity and imme-
diacy of the frustration resulting from allowance of the deduc-
tion. The flexibility of such a standard is necessary if we are
to accommodate both the congressional intent to tax only
net income, and the presumption against congressional intent to
encourage violation of declared public policy.
... Deduction of fines and penalties uniformly has been
held to frustrate state policy in severe and direct fashion by
reducing the "sting" of the penalty prescribed by the state leg-
islature. 53
While the Supreme Court used both deterrence and frustra-
tion language, the deterrence argument was of very doubtful
applicability given the economic necessity for violating the stat-
ute. Also there seems to have been only a marginal amount of
frustration, since the state policy was so weakly stated and en-
forced. This is in sharp contrast to the antitrust laws in which
deterrence is much more of a factor, the policy concerned is a
federal one and therefore entitled to more respect, and serious
sanctions are provided. The most serious of the sanctions, argu-
ably, is the treble damage provision. Consequently, the use of
the Tank Truck Rentals rationale to deny the deduction appears
more appropriate in the context of a treble damage case than in
Tank Truck Rentals itself.
4. Deductibility of Attorney Fees
In Commissioner v. Heininger,54 the Supreme Court upheld
deductions for attorney fees and other expenses incurred in an
unsuccessful battle against an administrative fraud order is-
sued by the Postmaster General. In Commissioner v. Tellier,55
the Court also upheld deduction of the costs of unsuccessfully
defending a criminal prosecution under the federal securities
acts. The Court rejected the suggestion that the public policy
exception to section 162 (a) warranted denial of the deduction, 56
stating that the exception should be narrowly applied:
Only where the allowance of a deduction would "frustrate
sharply defined national or state policies proscribing particular
52. Id. at 34-35.
53. Id. at 35-36.
54. 320 U.S. 467 (1943).
55. 383 U.S. 687 (1966).
56. Id. at 690.
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types of conduct" have we upheld its disallowance. Commis-
sioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S., at 473. Further, the "Policies frus-
trated must be national or state policies evidenced by some gov-
ernmental declaration of them." Lilly v. Commissioner, 343
U.S., at 97. (Emphasis added.) Finally, the "test of nondeduc-
tibility always is the severity and immediacy of the frustration
resulting from allowance of the deduction." Tank Truck Rent-
als v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 35.57
The Court thus balanced the bias for taxing only net income
against the deterrence and frustration factors. In Tellier, it
concluded that no public policy was offended by the exercise of
constitutional right to counsel and found no reason to add non-
deductibility of the attorney fees to the other sanctions of the
securities acts. The very remote deterrence and frustration re-
lationship between the penalty for wrongdoing and the costs of
defending and the recent emphasis upon the importance of the
right to representation both contributed to the Court's conclu-
sion that a deduction should be allowed. Thus, the Tellier case
represents no real retreat from the preceding line of cases.
In Tellier, the Court said that the availability of the business
expense deduction could be denied by specific legislation. 5 In
the long footnote following, the Court cited several examples of
specific legislation denying deductions for payments that vio-
late public policy. 59 Finally, in a citation beginning with a
"cf." signal, the Court referred to a congressional joint commit-
tee proposal to deny the deduction to treble damage payments.60
Some commentators apparently construe this reference to the
issue under consideration as a mini-opinion indicating Supreme
Court approval of the position taken by the Service in Revenue
Ruling 64-224.61 It is difficult to accept this construction. The
Court merely referred to the committee proposal for specific
legislation as an example to show that Congress has considered
measures to specifically disallow deduction of certain classes of
expenditures. Moreover, the Court stated that it recognizes cer-
tain limited exceptions to the general policy of allowing busi-
ness expense deductions "where Congress has been wholly si-
57. Id. at 694.
58. Id. at 693.
59. Id. at 693 n.10.
60. Id.
.... Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, Staff
Study of Income Tax Treatment of Treble Damage Payments
under the Antitrust Laws, Nov. 1, :1965, p. 16 (proposal that§ 162 be amended to deny deductions for certain fines, penal-
ties, treble damage payments, bribes, and kickbacks).
61. See, e.g., Bolland, Income Tax Treatment of Antitrust Dam-
ages, 22 TAX L. Rsv. 47, 57 (1966).
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lent."02 The Supreme Court knows how to indicate its position
on a matter not directly under consideration. The bare citation
of a committee proposal dealing with the treble damage problem
can hardly be interpreted as an indication of how the Court
would decide the question if it were presented.
5. Application of the Cases
The cases cited by the Internal Revenue Service in Revenue
Ruling 64-224 are not particularly apposite. The principles used
by the Supreme Court in the cases it has considered indicate that
the deduction for the penal portion of treble damages should
be denied. The frustration and deterrence factors are much
more strongly present than in the Tank Truck Rentals case. The
policy is a federal policy, not just a state policy, and the degree
of seriousness of the offense, indicated by the severity of the
penalties and the diligence of enforcement, is far greater than in
Tank Truck Rentals.
There are other lower federal court cases which might be
discussed, but most contribute little to an naalysis of the problem,
and none raises the issue directly.63 The cases which do analyze
the treble damage payments and characterize them as penal or
remedial do not contribute to analysis of the tax deduction prob-
lem, since the purpose for the characterization in each case is
completely different. In any case, the relevant policies behind
the statute must be considered and weighed. The sort of legal
analysis used by the Service in the revenue ruling was simply
mechanical jurisprudence which did not meet the important
issues and did not discuss the relevant cases in any meaning-
ful way.
The fact that the treble damage penalty arises out of a civil
case and is not paid to the federal government can hardly have
much bearing, in view of the kind of analysis employed by the
Supreme Court. Deterrence and frustration are just as much
present, whether or not the state or federal treasury is en-
riched by the payment. The intended role of treble damages
as an enforcement measure is clear.
The conclusion in the ruling that damages paid to the United
States under section 4A of the Clayton Act or under the Fed-
62. 383 U.S. at 693.
63. The cases are discussed in STAPr STUDY oF INcoAM TAx
TREATMENT OF TREBLE DAMAGE PAYMENTS UNDER THE ANTI-TRUST LAws,
JOINT Coi=nVTTE ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION 24, 30-31, 36-38,
46-59 (1965).
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eral False Claims Act are in the nature of a penalty for injury to
the public6" is rather startling. Such damages, not trebled,
would seem to be more like mere restitution or an adjustment of
price. The treble damages bear a greater resemblance to pun-
ishment for violations. The accident that the payment is to the
government does not provide a satisfactory basis for distinction.
The law is violated to the same degree whether it is the govern-
ment or a private party that is injured. It is difficult to see how
simple damages would be punishment in any sense. Whether a
deduction should be given for the restitutionary portion of a
judgment is a close question on the policy level,6 5 but the
revenue ruling is seriously inconsistent when it denies a deduc-
tion for simple antitrust damages and allows a deduction for
treble damages.
III. THE POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
While the Supreme Court decisions, read with some atten-
tion to the context of each case, suggest that antitrust treble
damage should not be deductible as a business expense for fed-
eral income tax purposes, careful analysis of the competing
policies involved in this matter must be undertaken before any
definite conclusion can be reached. It is only proper to let policy
considerations control, since the issue has not been decided by the
Congress or the Court, and the existing authorities can usually
be manipulated to "support" almost any result, as Revenue Rul-
ing 64-224 so aptly demonstrates.
A. THE CASE FOR DENiAL OF THE DEucTioN
1. Deterrence
The deterrence argument simply stated is that the denial of
a deduction for antitrust treble damage payments increases the
penalty for violation of the antitrust laws, thereby increasing
the risks associated with violation and contributing materially
to deterring violation of those laws. It is difficult to prove em-
pirically that any deterrence results from a penalty imposed di-
rectly by law. The deterring effect of any penalty which is im-
posed indirectly through the operation of the federal income tax
laws is just as difficult to prove. It appears, however, that the
deterrence provided by denial of the deduction of a treble dam-
age payment should be actual and substantial.
64. Rev. Rul. 64-224, 1964-2 Cum. BuLL. 52, 54.
65. See part III, C infra.
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There is no doubt that denial of the deduction increases the
penalty and the risk of violation. By way of illustration,
assume that a violator has made a profit of $100,000 before
taxes as the result of conduct that is a violation of the antitrust
laws. Assume also that the profits and any deductions in-
volved in payment of damages will all be related to a combined
effective federal and state income tax rate of fifty per cent.
The after-tax profit from the violation would be $50,000. Assume
further that the violation is detected, the offender is convicted,
and treble damages of $300,000 are assessed and eventually paid.6
If a deduction is allowed for the $300,000 treble damage award
or a settlement payment in that amount, the after-tax cost of
the payment will be $150,000. Thus, the violator will have to
get away with two out of three violations which generate the
same amount of illegal profit in order to break even. If the
deduction is denied, the after-tax cost of the treble damage pay-
ment will be $300,000, and the violator will have to get away
with five out of six similar violations in order to break even. If
a deduction is denied for the penal two-thirds of the payment the
after-tax cost of the payment will be $250,000, and the violator
will have to get away with four out of five similar violations
in order to break even.
This additional indirect penalty resulting from denial of the
deduction is therefore substantial and should be a deterrent to
any businessman considering the costs of a possibly illegal course
of action. The threat is one of very large losses if those injured
by violations pursue the treble damage remedy with vigor, as
may easily happen when there is first a criminal conviction
which eases the burden of proof for those who seek civil relief
for damages caused by the same activity.67
Since a judgment that the Act has been violated may subject
the violator to treble damages, criminal sanctions, injunctive re-
lief, and substantial adverse publicity, it might be argued that
the denial of deduction of treble damage payments does not
provide a necessary additional deterrent. However, whatever
the deterring effect of these other sanctions might be, the only
66. For the sake of simplicity, we will not explore in any pre-
cise way problems of discount, settlement discount, rate of discovery
of violation, success in pressing claims, expenses of litigation, and
other possible penalties and factors.
67. Clayton Act § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 16 (a) (1964), provides that any
final judgment or decree in an action brought by the U.S. against a
defendant is prima facie evidence against the defendant in subsequent
actions.
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sanction that has any substantial financial impact is the treble
damage award, and that financial impact is, in effect, doubled
for a taxpayer in the fifty per cent bracket by denial of the
deduction. For example, in the notorious electrical industry
antitrust cases, the total fines as of 1965 were $2,000,000, while
settlements of $300,000,000 in the civil suits were predicted. 8
Each criminal offense can lead to a maximum fine of only
$50,000,69 and criminal sanctions may seem very remote to the
typical executive who probably knows few, if any, executives
who have ever been fined and even fewer who have ever been
imprisoned for antitrust violations. Thus, the treble damage pen-
alty appears to be the most significant in terms that are likely to
be relevant to business decision makers.
2. Frustration of Public Policy
A further reason for denying the deduction of any expendi-
ture on the basis of public policy is that allowance of the de-
duction will in some way "frustrate" the public policy of the
jurisdiction that enacted the regulatory law which has been
violated. The frustration argument appears to cover some of
the same ground as the deterrence argument, since it is used to
describe at least two distinguishable effects: (1) frustration
occurs because the deduction reduces the penalty and the sting
of the penalty, and (2) frustration occurs because the deduction
reduces the deterring effect of the penalty.
The two elements of frustration are illustrated in the Tank
Truck Rentals case, where the Court seemingly used the frus-
tration and deterrence language interchangeably. The facts of
Tank Truck Rentals do not suggest any real deterrence factor
in the penalties therein involved because the economic need to
violate the weight limits was great and the cost, given the remote
chance of being caught, was very small. The allowance of the
deduction would have made the policy of deliberate violation
even more profitable, but any actual deterrence was hard to find.
Thus, if frustration of public policy means only the lessening of
deterrence, then there was little or no frustration either. But
the danger of frustration involved in. Tank Truck Rentals argu-
ably was not the lessening of deterrence, despite the Court's
confusing use of language. The real. frustration was in the re-
duction of the punitive effect or the "sting" of the penalty
which would have resulted from allowance of the deduction and
68. STAPF STUDY, supra note 63, at 21, 44.
69. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
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would have offended the public policy of the jurisdiction that
enacted the regulatory statute. Presumably, a federal regulatory
policy, such as that embodied in the antitrust laws and its major
enforcement tool, should be entitled to even greater respect
from the federal courts than a marginally expressed state policy,
such as that involved in Tank Truck Rentals. Thus, the deduc-
tion should be disallowed to prevent any reduction in the puni-
tive effect of treble damages.
Furthermore, the element of frustration of the policy of the
antitrust laws is found not only in the reduction of the "sting,"
but also in the arbitrary and whimsical way in which the reduc-
tion occurs. The amount of relief from the penalty provided
by a deduction varies because of differences in the tax status of
the violators. One violator may have his top income taxed at
combined federal and state rates exceeding seventy-five per cent,
others at fifty per cent, some at twenty per cent, and a few have
no taxes at all because of losses. The relief provided by the
deductions, therefore, is a reduction of the penalty at the above
rates. Ordinarily, all other things being equal, we prefer to
see greater penalties imposed on those who are affluent than
on those who are not, but the tax effect of a deduction for the
treble damage penalty has the opposite effect. It is whimsical
for the tax relief from a penalty to depend upon the tax bracket
of the offender in a way that is unrelated or inapposite to the
policies that ordinarily determine the amount of penalties.7 0
B. AmGumENs AGAINST DEIuAL OF THE DEDUCTION
1. A Tax on Net Income
It is generally true that our income tax is imposed on net
rather than gross income. Consequently, any public policy excep-
tion which denies deduction to an otherwise deductible business
expense is inconsistent with this principle. On the other hand,
there may be strong reasons to deviate from the general net in-
come principle in cases where some specific and important ob-
jective is thereby served.
However, we must be cautious in the use of the Internal
Revenue Code to encourage or discourage specific conduct. If
we attempt to discourage too broad a scope of activities through
70. It has been argued that the denial of the deduction is arbitrary
because the resulting increase in the tax burden is dependent upon the
tax bracket of the violator. However, granting the deduction is more
arbitrary than denying the deduction *because of the preference for
having greater penalties fall on those who are more affluent.
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the denial of deductions, the effect may ultimately be tax neu-
trality with respect to the activities which we sought to discour-
age.71 Furthermore, extensive use of the denial of deductions
may lead to widespread nonreporting of income when the bur-
den of taxation without deductions becomes too great. There-
fore, it would seem best to restrict such use of the Code in
order to retain the effectiveness of the technique and to keep
the taxing system generally consistent with the principle of
taxing net income. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the limited
use of the denial of deductions for criminal fines and certain
other penalties such as antitrust treble damage payments will
not compromise the net income principle in any significant way.
2. Neutrality
It has been argued that the tax system should maintain its
neutrality toward the character of the income taxed and, there-
fore, that deductions should be allowed for fines and penalties.72
However, it is not easy to determine what position is neu-
tral. Even though a deduction may serve neutrality as a matter
of tax law, it does not necessarily serve neutrality so far as
antitrust policy is concerned. In addition, the whimsical results
of deduction may be very offensive. It is not obvious, there-
fore, that allowing the deduction and thereby affording real re-
lief from a sanction imposed by a nontax law is a neutral
result.
This search for neutrality is question begging since what is
really needed is a balancing of both the relevant tax and other
statutory policies, not merely an invocation of conclusions from
a partial analysis of the matter.
3. Regulation in Nontax Areas
It has been argued that the federal income tax system
should not be used in any manner to enforce other laws or
regulations.7 3 The use of the tax system as a means of regula-
tion is wrong, it is argued, because such indirect regulation was
never intended by Congress and because it is better done directly.
71. See, e.g., Sneed, The Criteria of Federal Income Tax Policy, 17
STAN. L. REV. 567 (1965); Sneed, Fundamental Concepts of Public Law
Symposium, No. 7, Taxation, 11 J. PuB. L. 3, 13 (1962).
72. E.g., Keesling, Illegal Transactions and the Income Tax, 5
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 26, 36-37 (1958).
73. See, e.g., Paul, The Use of Public Policy by the Commissioner
in Disallowing Deductions, U. So. CAL. 1954 TAX. INST. 715.
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This principle that the tax system was not intended for regula-
tion and enforcement outside the tax area is generally accepted,
but it is frequently violated by Congress itself. In regard to a
particular deduction it is useful only as a cautionary princi-
ple, since it does not aid an objective analysis to start with
the conclusion.
Moreover, it is not proper to talk of the specific intention of
the Congress on a narrow point in a complex statutory pattern,
since Congress probably never considered the matter either in
passing the treble damage provision or in enacting the tax laws.
Since we are unable to find any expression of congressional in-
tent, we must either try to guess at what Congress would
have done or, more realistically, decide on the merits what, as a
matter of policy, should be done in an area which Congress has
left open.
The general principle that direct regulation is more desir-
able than indirect regulation does not help to solve our problem
either. The antitrust laws provide direct regulation of the
proscribed conduct in this area. It must be determined whether
indirect regulation through the tax laws would aid, hinder, or
not affect the direct regulation at all. Given the beneficial ef-
fect to the violator of allowing the deduction, as well as the
other policy factors, it seems that indirect regulation by a de-
nial of the deduction is appropriate here.
4. Antitrust Damages Are Not Criminal Fines
It has been argued that because antitrust damages arise out
of civil rather than criminal actions the deduction should be
permitted. 4  This argument appears to be a rather technical
one, based on a few lower court decisions,7 5 not examined in this
Article, which do not themselves compel any specific result.
Moreover, these cases do not relate consistently to the Supreme
Court's policy approach to the availability of the deductions,
where such technical distinctions are irrelevant. Rather, it is
important to decide what policies will be served by granting or
denying a deduction. In this connection the policies rather
than labels should control. If federal policy is clearly expressed
by the treble damage provisions, and if no deduction would be
desirable for reasons of deterrence and frustration, then the
civil or criminal labels have no real' significance. Even on the
level of labels, a sanction such as treble damages may have a
74. See STAFF STUDy, supra note 63, at 36-38.
75. See note 63 supra.
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greater penal effect than a criminal fine and, on the policy
level, this is one of the important factors in the case for de-
terrence.
5. Inadvertent Violators
The plight of the inadvertent violator initially provokes a
sympathetic response. If a company is convicted of violating the
antitrust laws under some new theory retroactively applied, de-
terrence and frustration seemingly are not involved. It could be
argued that in such cases, there should be an exception to the
usual policy of denying the deduction, or it could be argued
that, in view of the desirability of such an exception and the
difficulty of distinguishing intentional from inadvertent viola-
tions it would be better to grant the deduction to all violators.
The Supreme Court held squarely the opposite in Tank
Truck Rentals. But most of the cases do involve "hard core,"
intentional violations rather than violations which are on the
horizon of an antitrust enforcement theory. It is beyond dispute
that the cases which led to Revenue Ruling 64-224 were hard
core cases. Moreover, it is illogical to allow the comparatively
rare case of the inadvertent offender to control the result in
the case of the intentional violator.
Since it is difficult to distinguish the intentional violator
from the inadvertent, or the hard core case (for instance, price-
fixing) from the fringe case (perhaps a merger that occurred
fifty years ago), there should not be any difference in result
among them. Creation of a system for the separate treatment
of these cases is a task for which Congress is far better suited
than the courts. Therefore, the deduction should be denied in
all cases, unless or until Congress distinguishes among them.
Even if it were easy to identify the fringe and inadvertent
violator, there is another reason for not treating him differ-
ently. The imposition of substantial sanctions, including the
increased penalty of the denial of a tax deduction, on fringe and
inadvertent violators will increase the businessman's incentive
to be well informed on the antitrust laws and more careful in
his business. He will have more reason to avoid not only hard
core violations, but also other activ.ties that may arguably be
violations of the antitrust laws.
6. Other Ways to Deter Offenders
There are, of course, other ways to deter offenders. The
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penalty may be increased. The deduction could be selectively
denied, on a case-by-case basis, either in the tax courts or in the
other courts where the fine or penalty is imposed. Jail sen-
tences could be imposed. Congress could decide which categories
of cases should be denied deductions. Congress might decide to
permit a company one antitrust violation with a deductible
treble damage payment, to deny the deduction only in hard
core cases, or to deny it only after a criminal conviction. But
these proposals should be considered by Congress, since they
call for rather particularized legislation which is not character-
istic of the judicial process.7 6
7. Other Antitrust Considerations
It has been suggested that antitrust policy factors other
than deterrence should be considered. One argument is that
since denying the deduction in the electrical equipment cases
would have upset competition in the electrical industry by
destroying the small competitors,77 it could have the same effect
in other cases. This argument, however, is applicable only to
small but profitable concerns, since the deduction would be of
little or no value to a truly marginal operation. In the abstract,
it is difficult to see how denial of the deduction would push un-
der a small but profitable operation. In addition, it is a rather
difficult argument for a court or the Internal Revenue Service
either to evaluate in general or to apply in particular cases.
Although it might be relevant in a particular case, it should
not be a prime consideration in deciding whether to allow the
deduction to all companies, including the largest. If relief from
the effects of treble damage payments is needed by a few com-
panies in order to preserve competition, the legislature would be
a more appropriate place to file the request for such relief.
Another argument against denying the deduction is that the
cost of any treble damage payment is ultimately passed on
to consumers in the form of higher prices, so that increasing the
burden by taxation would only increase the prices to consumers.
Even though it probably is true that taxes and other typically
recurring costs are passed on to consumers, it appears more
doubtful that an unusual one-time cost such as a treble damage
76. Bills have been introduced by Senator Hart, S. 2804, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1967) and by Senator Long, S. 2963, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968),
to specify in detail the tax treatment of antitrust treble damage payments.
77. STAFF Srtmy, supra note 63, at 32, 38 (points made by interested
parties in industry).
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payment would be passed on. Since it is not clear that higher
prices would follow, some substantial data or proof should be
offered before this argument is accepted. However, even if
data demonstrating passing on is produced, the deterrence and
frustration factors more than offset its effect.
C. BALANCING THE INTERESTS
The tax-net-income-only principle must still be reconciled
with the policy reasons for denying the deduction. It would
certainly not be advisable to deny -the deduction for every sort
of undesirable expense the mind of man can imagine. That
would be too much of a departure from a net income tax,
would be too much of an excursion of the tax law into the area
of regulation, and would not be selective enough to provide real
deterrence where it is needed. Moreover, compliance and collec-
tion difficulties might be increased. It would not be wise to
try to impose, in effect, a gross income tax on illegal businesses.
But a denial of the deduction for criminal fines is a far nar-
rower, limited sanction which can be easily applied.
In the case of antitrust treble damage payments, the in-
jurious activity might also be a crininal violation, but it is not
necessarily so in every case. In addition, there is an important
federal policy involved. Thus, it appears that the deterrence
and frustration factors are fully applicable. Treble damage pay-
ments are unlike ordinary, compensatory damages for a tort or
breach of contract. Instead treble damage payments are ex-
plicitly punitive and extraordinary and are intended to be, or at
least have the effect of being, a penalty for engaging in unde-
sirable activity. This penalty is an important adjunct to the
criminal penalty in that it brings the injured party into the en-
forcement mechanics of the Act. This function of providing the
injured party with an incentive to sue takes nothing away from
the penalty function of treble damages. They are consistent
with and reinforce each other.
The decision ultimately involves a choice between increasing
the penalty or decreasing it. Clearly, it is better to increase
the sanction in this limited area, since such an increase is con-
sistent with important policies behind the antitrust laws. In
addition, increasing the penalty by denying a deduction for its
payment produces a coherent and rational system consistent with
the existing Supreme Court cases. Treble damages are thought
to be more of a penalty than overweight truck fines. Consistency
and fairness in tax administration require that persons similarly
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situated receive similar treatment. If antitrust treble damages
are fully deductible, those who are denied deductions for fines
imposed for less serious infractions are not treated fairly.
Having balanced all the relevant considerations, and having
decided to deny the deduction, the question of whether the de-
nial of deduction should apply to the entire treble damage pay-
ment or just to the punitive two-thirds still remains unanswered.
Part of a treble damage award frequently represents an adjust-
ment of price between a buyer and seller. In other cases, the
amount proved as actual damages bears a considerable resem-
blance to tort damages. In both cases, it may be desirable to
allow a deduction for the actual damage proved. Allocation prob-
lems could be left to the taxpayer to resolve, with the Service's
approval. In the absence of proof, one-third of each award or
settlement paid could be presumed to be actual damages, and
only the punitive part of the award would be denied deduction.
This refinement would preserve the tax-net-income-only
principle for the part of the award that more closely resembles a
price adjustment or a tort judgment. This has theoretical ap-
peal since it breaks the payment down into its compensatory
and punitive elements and treats each as other analogous pay-
ments of the same type are treated. The deterrence factor is
maintained, although it might be argued that it is only two-
thirds as effective. Frustration should not be affected since the
punitive element of the damages would not be deductible, re-
inforcing the federal policy behind the antitrust treble damage
provisions.
Determining whether the price adjustment part of the treble
damage payment should be deductible is a difficult balancing
problem. The deduction approach seems better on theoretical
grounds, but a contrary decision to emphasize the deterrence as-
pect would certainly be justified.
If a deduction for the simple price adjustment part of the
award or settlement is granted, a question arises concerning
payments to the government. Revenue Ruling 64-224 holds that
payments of simple damages to the United States are not de-
ductible.78 There is, however, no reason to treat payments to
the Government and payments to a private plaintiff differently.
The elements of deterrence and frustration are the same. If
frustration is evident in a case brought by the Government,
then it will likely be equally as evident in a case brought by a
78. Rev. Rul. 64-224, 1964-2 Cum. BULL. 52, 54.
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private plaintiff. The frustration does not depend upon the
identity of the plaintiff.
The identity of the plaintiff will, however, determine whether
there can be treble damages, since the United States is not
permitted to recover them.79 In such cases, if the damages rep-
resent an adjustment of price, a deduction would be appropriate,
if it has been decided to grant the deduction for the nonpunitive
part of the award in the treble damage case.
IV. THE PROPRIETY OF ISSUING TE RULING
It has been argued above thai; both the relevant policy
considerations and the relevant authorities suggest denial of the
deduction. It may, however, also be argued that the issuance
of Revenue Ruling 64-224 was highly improper and involved a
gross misuse of the ruling power. The revenue consequences of
this ruling are as great as any that have ever turned on a revenue
ruling. Political pressure to issue it in a form granting the de-
duction was very intense, and there may have been some feeling
in high places that the government should do something to indi-
cate that it was not anti-business, since it had aroused animosity
in the business community by its attempts to control price in-
creases by some of the country's largest industrial firms.
Generally speaking, however, one would expect any rela-
tively doubtful case to lead either to no ruling at all or to a
ruling unfavorable to the taxpayer. It is expected that the
government, through the Internal Revenue Service, will gener-
ally take a position that favors increasing the revenue, and
that seems fair.
Business must go on, however, and in many cases it cannot
proceed without a ruling clarifying a doubtful area. Overall fair-
ness and the exigencies of the situation may suggest that the
Service take a more neutral, quasi-judicial position in such cases
and issue a ruling that takes into consideration the fact that the
Service is the court of last resort and that its disposition may
not be reviewable. But generally the Service takes a pro-revenue
position in regulations, in rulings, and in its litigating and ex-
amination positions.
The favorable ruling issued in this case does not fit this
ordinary picture. The Service turned its back on a defensible,
revenue producing, judicially reviewable position in favor of
79. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1964); 31 U.S.C. § 231 (1964); United
States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600 (1941).
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one that is difficult to defend, costs the government revenue,
and cannot be judicially reviewed.
While it has been argued that an unfavorable ruling would
have had serious detrimental effects upon competition in in-
dustry, this is hardly the sort of factor the Internal Revenue
Service is equipped to weigh, and its relevance in a tax deter-
mination is doubtful. Although it was argued that the settle-
ment of lawsuits would be encouraged by the ruling, it is not
clear why that is so. If the benefits of a plaintiff's winning are
the same, either way, but the penalties of a defendant losing are
increased, it would seem that the defendants would have even
more incentive to settle.
It is granted that the Internal Revenue Service does per-
form a socially useful function by issuing private and public rul-
ings, and that there are some advantages in having the Service,
in certain cases, grant favorable rulings in doubtful areas. How-
ever, to have done so in this case was a grave abuse of discretion.
V. CONCLUSION
The issuance by the Internal Revenue Service of Revenue
Ruling 64-224 permitting the deduction of antitrust treble dam-
age payments to a private person as a business expense but
denying the deduction for simple damage payments to the gov-
ernment was unwarranted. The relevant authorities are at best
ambiguous and do not compel the result reached. The Service
abandoned its traditional position of not issuing a revenue ruling
favoring the taxpayer in doubtful cases. Finally and most im-
portantly, a balancing of the public policies underlying both the
income tax and the antitrust laws indicates that the deduction
of at least the punitive two-thirds of a private treble damage
payment should be denied and that the other one-third of a pri-
vate payment and damage payments to the government should
be given consistent treatment.
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